cves

publicly-credited vulnerability disclosures across kernel and userspace targets. each row links to the nvd record and (where available) the lore announcement and original write-up.

total
9
direct
8
sister-fix
1
avg cvss
7.9

2026

  • smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path

    Linux kernel - Linux SMB client (fs/smb/client) [CWE-125]

    The Linux SMB client's smb2_ioctl_query_info() had two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL was bounds-checked since 2019, but the QUERY_INFO branch never validated qi.input_buffer_length against the on-wire response, allowing a malicious SMB server to drive an out-of-bounds copy on the response buffer tail.

  • ksmbd: validate num_aces and harden ACE walk in smb_inherit_dacl()

    Linux kernel - ksmbd (fs/smb/server) [NVD-CWE-noinfo]

    ksmbd's smb_inherit_dacl() trusted the on-disk num_aces from a parent directory's stored DACL. A crafted parent DACL could drive smb_inherit_dacl into an out-of-bounds ACE walk, with potential 32-bit allocation-size overflow on the inherited buffer construction.

  • smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl

    Linux kernel - Linux SMB client (fs/smb/client) [NVD-CWE-noinfo]

    The Linux SMB client's cifsacl chmod/chown paths trusted server-supplied dacloffset and num_aces fields when rebuilding ACLs locally. A malicious server could provide a DACL whose advertised structure exceeded the actual buffer, causing replace_sids_and_copy_aces() and set_chmod_dacl() to walk past the validated end of the security descriptor.

    Client-side counterpart of CVE-2025-21994. Sent 2026-04-16 v1, 2026-04-20 v2; in-thread follow-up KCIFS2_END_OF_DACL_DEBUG2 sent 2026-04-21.

  • ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()

    Linux kernel - ksmbd (fs/smb/server) [CWE-787]

    ksmbd's ipc_validate_msg() computed the expected message size for each response type by summing or multiplying attacker-controlled fields from the userspace daemon's response into unsigned int arithmetic. Three response cases could overflow the size computation, leading to under-allocated buffers consumed by downstream parsing.

    Patch 1 of a 3-patch series; this is the cap on response sizes. Patches 2 and 3 (ksmbd_alloc_user negative ngroups, smb_check_perm_dacl ACE size) were merged separately and have not been individually CVE'd.

  • smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure

    Linux kernel - ksmbd (fs/smb/server) [CWE-401]

    ksmbd's transport allocation path leaked the active_num_conn counter when alloc_transport() returned NULL after a successful kernel_accept(). An unauthenticated remote attacker could drive cumulative allocation failures (e.g. via memory pressure) until atomic_inc_return() saturated max_connections, denying service to legitimate SMB clients.

    Pre-auth slow remote DoS. Companion to other ksmbd hardening sent in the same week.

  • CVE-2026-31611 8.6 HIGH sister-fix

    ksmbd: require 3 sub-authorities before reading sub_auth[2]

    Linux kernel - ksmbd (fs/smb/server) [NVD-CWE-noinfo]

    The Linux kernel ksmbd parse_dacl() compared each ACE SID against sid_unix_NFS_mode using only min(num_subauth, 2) sub-authorities. A client SID with num_subauth = 2 could match the NFS-mode SID prefix; reading sub_auth[2] then crossed the end-of-ACL boundary by 4 bytes, applying out-of-band bytes as the file's POSIX mode.

    Server-side sister of my client-side patch (sent 2026-04-20 to linux-cifs@). Same bug class in fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c was disclosed first; the server-side variant in fs/smb/server/smbacl.c was patched independently by the ksmbd maintainers in response, and that's the path the CVE was assigned for.

2002